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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
lL\ L H Y DINTRIB UTORS, INC., 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
LOCAL UNION 976, JOINT COUNCIL 
67, \\7ESTERN CONFERENCE OF 
'rEA~LSTEHS, INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
Cl LA UFFEURS, \r AREHOUSEMEN 
AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, AFL-
CIO, MILO V. RASH, CLARENCE 
LOTT and JOSEPH W. BALLEW, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATE:JIENT OF CASE 
Case No. 
10160 
This is an a1ppeal from Order of the District Court of 
8alt Lake County, Utah, wherein on March 23, 1964, 
Aldon J .. Anderson, one of the judges of said court, with-
out notiee to the defendants, amended a judgment made 
and entered by him on October 30, 1957, by adding inter-
5 
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est thereon at sro per annum from and after the date of 
the judgment. 
(a) DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT. 
A motion was made in 1said District Court by said de~ 
fendants to make and set aside the Order amending the 
judgment of October 30, 19~57, which motion, after hear-
ing argument of counsel, was, on May 5, 1964, denied. 
(R. 13) 
(b) THE RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL. 
Defendants and appellants on this appeal seek a reversal 
of the Order or Judgment adding interest to the Judg-
Inent of October 30, 19·57. 
(c) ST4TEJJ1ENT OF FACTS. On or about 
J·une 28, 1956., Dairy Distributors, Inc., brought an ae-
tion in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County, 
Utah, against Local Union 976, Joint Council 67, Western 
Oonference of Teamsters, the International Brotherhood 
of Team~sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers 
of Ameriea, AFL-CIO, Milo V. Rash, Clarence Lott and 
Joseph W. Ballew, Defendants. In its Complaint, plain-
tiff in ~substance alleges: 
That plaintiff is a corporation engaged in buying 
and selling Swiss cheese and other dairy products from 
the Cache Valley Dairy Association of Amalga, Cache 
County, Utah, and transporting and selling the same to 
N. Dorman and Company in New York City. 
That on or about July 25, 1955, the defendants un-
lawfully picketed Dorman and Oompany 's premises in 
6 
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New York City and by coercion and threats of Local 277, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, induced .and 
persuaded ·~mid employees to refuse to handle or unload 
from 'plaintiff's trucks the Swiss cheese owned by plain-
tiff thereby destroying plaintiff's business to its damage 
in the sum of $125,000.00. Plaintiff also claimed punitive 
damage~s in the sum of $50,000.00. Plaintiff prayer judg-
ment against the defendants in the sum of $125,000.00 
together with cos~s. (R. 3) 
To the Complaint, defendants in their Answer al-
leged that the court was without jurisdiction of the sub-
ject rna tter or the persons of defendants, and denied 
generally the allegations of the Complaint. (R. 4) When 
the case came on for trial, the Complaint was amended 
by striking the ~negations as to punitive damages. At 
the conclusion of the evidence offered on behalf of plain-
tiff, the defendants jointly and severally moved the court 
to dismiss the action and to direct the jury to bring in 
a verdict in favor of the defendants. The motion was 
taken under advisement. Such motion was renewed at 
the conclusion of the evidence and was by the court 
denied. At the conclusion of all of the evidence; counsel 
for plaintiff moved the court to dismiss the case as to 
Rash and Lott, which motion was granted. The jury 
brought in five separate verdicts. Each of the verdicts 
was for $100,000.00, and was rendered October 29, 1957. 
(R. ~4, 25, 26, 27 and 28) The Clerk did not enter any 
judgment on the five verdicts rendered, but on his own 
initiative signed in typewriting the name of the foreman 
of the jury, and entered the following verdict: 
7 
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''JUDGMENT ON VERDICT 
This action ·came on regularly for trial. The said 
parties appeared by their attorneys. A jury of 8 
persons was regularly impaneled and sworn to 
try said action. Witnesses on the part of plain-
tiff and defendant were sworn and examined. 
After hearing evidence, the argument of counsel, 
and instructions of the Court, the jury retired to 
consider of their verdict, and subsequently re-
turned into Court, and being called, answered to 
their namHs, and say they find a verdict for the 
Plaintiff and against the defendant. 
'We, the Jurors impaneled in the a hove case, 
find the issues in favor of the Plaintiff and against 
the Drefendant Local Union #976, Joint Council 
#67, Western Conference of Teamsters, The In-
ternational Brotherhood of Temnsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen, and HeLpers of America 
A.F.L.-C.I.O., Joseph Ballew and assess damage·s 
as follows: $100,000.00.' 
October 30 
George J. Barrott 
Foreman 
Wherefore, by virtue of the law and by reason 
of the premises aforesaid, it is ordered, adjudged 
and decreed that said plaintiff have and recover 
from defendant the sum of $100,000.00 Dollars 
with interest thereon at the rate of - - per cent 
per from the date hereof till paid, together 
with said -- and disbursements incurred in this 
action, amounting to the sum of $100,000.00 
Dollar.s. 
Judgment entered October 30 A.D. 1957. 
State of Utah, County of Salt Lake ss. 
I, Alvin Keddington, Clerk of the Third Judi-
8 
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t'ial District Court of the State of Utah, in and for 
tlw County of Salt Lake, do hereby certify that 
tlll' l'on'going is a full, true and correct copy of 
the judgment entered in the above entitled action. 
vVitness my hand and the Seal of said Court, 
at ~alt Lake City, this 30th day of October A.D. 
1957. 
(.Seal) 
(H. 7) 
Alvin Keddington, Clerk 
Alvin !{eddington, Clerk 
By Roy L. I-Iardy, Deputy Clerk'' 
The defendants timely, jointly and severally filed a 
motion to have the judgment for plaintiff vacated and 
.indgment entered for defendants and each of them, and 
if that could not be done that a new trial be granted. The 
motion was denied. On January 9, 1958, witholit notice to 
any of the defendants, upon a motion of plaintiff, the 
judgment against Joseph \V. Bellew was vacated. (R. 8) 
Defendants prosecuted an appeal_to the Supreme Court 
of Utah from the judgment rendered against them. The 
judg·ment was affirmed. 
The Supren1e Court of Utah also denied a motion 
for rehearing. The decision by the .Supreme Court of 
Utah is reported in 8 Utah 2d 124,329 Pac. 2d 414. A copy 
thereof is attached to the Remititur. (R. 9) D~fendants 
filed in the Supreme Court of the United States a Peti-
tion for a \Vrit of Certiorari. The petition was denied. 
Thereupon defendant, \V estern Conference of Teamsters 
filed a suit against the plaintiff in the United States Dis-
trict Court of Utah, Central Division. In the Complaint 
so filed, the proceedings theretofore had were alleged. 
9 
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Said Court granted the Western Conference of Team-
sters the relief prayed. A copy of the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decree is attached hereto in 
the Appendix and marked Exhibit A. 
Dairy Di·stributors appealed from the above men-
tioned judgment. The court reversed the judgment of 
the United States District Court. A copy of the U.S. 
Tenth Circuit Court opinion is attached in the Appendix 
hereto and marked Exhibit B. The opinion of the U.S. 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals is reported in 294 Fed. 
2d 348. 
Western Conference of Team~ters filed a Motion for 
Rehearing in the Tenth Circuit of Appeals wherein it 
called to the attention of that court the fact that it had 
erred in a number of particulars, among which were, 
that contrary to the findings of the Circuit Court of 
Appeals, the record of all of the evidence taken at the 
trial in the Third District Court of Utah was received 
in evidence in the United States District Court and also 
before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. That it was 
admitted in the pleadings of Dairy Distributors filed in 
the Federal District Court; that it did not have, at the 
time complained of, any kind of permit from the United 
States Interstate Commerce Commission to engage in 
interstate commerce, nothwithstanding, in its opinion, 
the Circuit Court of Appeals found that Dairy Distribu-
tors had a permit as a private carrier, and nothwith-
standing the Interstate C01nmerce Gommis·sion was not 
empowered and does not issue permits to private car-
10 
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rier~. United :··Hates Tenth CirC'uit. Court of Appeals 
denied a hearing· without further comment or opinion. 
"\ fter denial of the Petion for Rehearing by the 
Cireuit Uourt of Appeals, Western Conference of Team-
~tl'n' filed a Petition f.or vYrit of Certiorari in the Su-
preme Court of the United States, which was by that 
court denied. In the opinion of the Circuit Court of 
Appeals it is stated that the Western Conference of 
'Peamsters should have brought the suit in equity in 
the state court and not in the Federal District Court. 
Recause of such statement, Local Union 976, one of the 
defendant herein, brought suit in equity against Dairy 
Distributors in Cache County, Utah, the place where 
said Dair:v Distributors, Inc., was engaged in business. 
In such suit, Local Union 976 sought to enjoin the en-
forcement of the judgment rendered by the Third District 
Court of Salt Lake County, Utah. In the Complaint in 
that suit, the proceedings theretofore had touching the 
judgment herein involved were alleged. In that suit, 
Dairy Distributor.s moved that the suit be dismissed. 
The motion was denied by the District Court of Cache 
County. Thereupon Dairy Distributors applied to the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah fo-r a Writ of 
Prohibition. In the petition for the writ the title of the 
case of Local Union 976 v. Dairy Distributors was not 
changed, but the Judge of the District Court of Cache 
County, t:tah, was ordered to show cause, on a date 
fixed, why it should not be prohibited from proceeding 
to hear the case. The Judge of the District Court of 
Cache County appeared. After hearing was had . the 
11 
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.S~reme Court qf Utah changed the title of the cause 
to be Dairy Distributors, Inc., v~s. District Court of 
Cache County, and Honorable Lewis Jones, Judge, and 
Local Union 976, a labor organization, as defendants. 
The Supreme Court of Utah entered its Order perma-
nently enjoining the District Court from proceeding to 
hear the cause. Local Union 976 filed a Petition for Re-
hearing and a Brief in support thereof. In the Petition 
for Rehearing a number of claimed errors were alleged 
and cited in support thereof. The Petition for Rehear-
ing was promptly denied. 14 Utah 2d 146, 378 Pac. 2d 988. 
On October 26, 1962, Dairy Distributors sought to do-
mesticate said judgment of October 30, 1957, against 
Western Conference of Teamsters in the United States 
District Court for Northern California, which action 
W81S dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 
Thereafter, on or about December 2, 1963, Dairy 
Distributors, Inc., brought an action against Western 
Conference of Teamsters in the Superior Court o,f the 
Stat eof California in and for the City and County of 
San Francisco. In that action Dairy Distributors sought 
to domesticate the judgment rendered on October 30, 
1957, by the District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, 
including interest thereon from and after the date of 
the judgment at 8% per annum. We~stern Conference of 
Teamsters answered, in which Answer it was alleged 
that no interest was allowed by the judgment rendered 
in the Utah court. The California count ruled that it 
would not grant a judgment for interest so long as no 
interest was provided f·o·r in the Utah court judgment. 
12 
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.. \:-; abon• stated, on j[arch ~;~, 1964, the District Court 
of Halt Lake County, Utah, without notice to any of the 
defendants, granted the motion made by plaintiff to 
amend the judgment made on October 30, 1957, by adding 
inten•st thereon at 8)~ per annum on and after the 
date of the judgment. On May 5, 1964, the court denied 
defendant's Motion to Vacate and Set Aside such amend-
ment. (R. 18) At no time prior to :March 23, 1964, has 
Dairy Distributors co1nplained of the judgment entered 
on October 30, 1957, being incomplete. On the contrary, 
it contended and prevailed in its contention in the Su-
preme Court of Utah that such judgment should be 
affirmed. Prior to March 23, 1964, in all the proceedings 
had after the Suprmne Court of Utah affirmed its judg-
ment, Dairy Distributors contended that the Doctrine 
of Res Judicata precluded the courts from interfering 
with the judg1nent. In compliance with the provisions of 
Rule 75 we have directed the attention of the court to 
the facts shown by the record on appeal, and also to 
~:'Ome additional fa~ts ·which may he deemed material 
in disposing of the order or judgment appealed from. 
ARGUMENT 
Counsel for Dairy Distributors seems to have been 
uncertain as to law upon which the action here involved 
is based. In its Complaint filed in the District Court of 
~alt Lake County, it is not made to appear that the 
artion was brought under the Taft-Hartley Act. As 
originally drawn the Complaint sought punitive dam-
13 
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ages and judgment against Rash, Lott and Ballew. The 
Complaint was amended by striking out the allegations 
as to punitive damages. 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the action was 
dis·missed as to Lott and Rash, but not as to Ballew. 
During the month of January 1958, following October 30, 
19·57, when the judgment was rendered, such judgment 
was dismissed against Ballew without notice. Appar-
ently counsel for Dairy Distributors did not discover 
that the Taft-Hartley law did not authorize a judgment 
for punitive damages or against the individual mem-
bers of the Uniori until 1964. However, on March 23, 
1964, counsel for Dairy Distributors conceived the idea 
that Dairy Distributors were entitled to have intere.st 
on the judgment under the laws of Utah, notwithstand-
ing the Taft-Hartley law does not provide for interest. 
Unde,r the proceedings had prior to the present oontro-
versy, particularly the decisions of the Supreme Court 
of Utah, of the United States District Court, and the 
United States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, it is 
conclusively made to appear the action was tried and 
diSjposed of pur.suant to the Taft-Hartley Act. See Ex-
hibits A and B attached in the Appendix. 
POINT I. 
IN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION 
OF FEDERAL :STATUTES, FEDERAL, AND NOT 
STATE OR LOCAL LAW, APPLIES. 
14 
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8l'cfion 187 of the Taft-Hartley Act contains two 
l'HhdiYi:-;on~, (a) and (b). Subsection (a) makes it un-
lnwl'ul l'or a labor organization t·O· engage in or do cer-
tain spPcified ads, among which is, that of a secondary 
boyoott. Subsection (b) provides that "whoever ·shall 
he injured in his business or property by reason of any 
,·iolation of Subsection (a), shall reco.ver the damages 
by him sustained and costs of suit.'' U.S.C.A. 28, Section 
18.~. Our search fails to find a case by a court of last 
resort which holds or tends to support the view that a 
~tate court authorized to try and render a judgment 
in a controversy involving a federal law may add to a 
judgment interest on the judgment rendered, which is 
either contrary to or not authorized by the federal law 
on which the action is based. The adjudicated cases and 
the authorities generally condemn such results. Among 
the cases so holding are 
Chesapeake & Oh,io Railway v. Martin, 283 U.S. 
209, 212; De·itrick v. Creamey, 309 U.S. 190, 200; 
Brookland Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 715; 
Board of Commissioners v. United States, 308 
U.S. 345, 349; Clark v. H·ot Springs, etc., 76 Fed. 
2d (lOth Circuit) 918; lVashington and George-
tou:n Railroad Co., 147 U.S. 571, 589; Pierce v. 
U.S., 255 U.S. 398; Briggs Administratrix v. 
Pennsylrania R.ailway, 334 U.S. 304. 
The authorities are to the effect that "it is very 
generally stated that interest is purely of statutory ori-
gin and not the creature of the common law, and that 
interest should be refused except in such cases as aome 
within the terms of the statute unless it has been con-
15 
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traeted either expressly or impliedly, and it has been 
said that to determine whether or not interest is to be 
charged in a particular case is a mere matter of statu-
tory interpretation.'' The foregoing is quoted from 47 
C.J.S., pages 14 and 15. Numerous cases are cited in 
footnotes to the text. We shall not undertake the Her-
culean task of discussing those cases, but under Point 
III of this brief we shall discuss the construction that 
h~s been placed upon the statutory law and Rules of 
Civil Procedure by the federal court and courts ·of Utah. 
The fact that thi·s action is under a federal statute and 
not the laws of Utah is of importance in determining the 
questions involved in this action. It is established law 
that when the construction of a state law is involved in 
an action brought in a federal court, the construction 
placed upon a state law by the court of last resort of 
the -state is of controlling importance. By the same 
token, an action brought in a state court involving a 
federal question, it is a federal law that is controlling. 
It was urged by counsel for plaintiff at the hearing 
of its Motion to Dismiss the Appeal that interest was 
included in the judgment of October 30, 1957, without 
provision having been made for the payment of interest 
thereon. It was conceded, however, that there is no Utah 
case supporting such view. In our search we have been 
unable to find a state court which holds that interest is 
included in a judgment without expressly being made a 
part of the judgment, except where the Constitution or 
law so provides. See Hagerman v. Moran, Nov. 1896, 75 
F. 97, 21 C.C.A. 242; Section 22 of Article 20 of the Con-
16· 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
~fitutinn o1 Oaliforuia provides that judgments shall 
bear interest at 7)'~, notwithstanding the judgment does 
not ~o provide. The construction given to judgments 
rendered under various federal laws prior to 19·61 touch-
ing the question of ·whether interest should or should 
not be allowed on a judgment depended on the construc-
tion that should be given to the law upon which the judg·-
ment was founded, that is to say, if the construction of 
the law provided that interest may be allowed, the 
;judgment should so provide, otherwise not. In addition 
to the cases cited heretofore the following case's show 
the trend of judicial authority where federal law is in-
volved. Reed v. H owbert, 77 Fed. 2d 277, 10 C.C.A. 1935; 
Ora.lJ v. Dukedom Bank, 216 Fed. 2d 108. The Taft-Hart-
ley is silent as to whether or not a judgment such a.s 
that here involved is to bear interest. 1 A.L.R. 2d 480, et 
seq .. has an excellent summary o.f this problem. 
Utah has a statute, U.C.A. 1953, 68-3-3, whcih pro-
vides that 
''No part of these revised statute.s is retroactive 
unless expressly so declared.'' 
..:\ number of cases are cited in footnotes to the text 
among which is J(ansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 129 
Fed. 2d 287. Needless to say, the act above quoted was 
not intended to affect the judgment here involved. In-
deed it is elen1entary that the law making branch of 
government may not lawfully amend a judgment. 
17 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
U.C.A. 1953, 15-1-4, provides: 
"Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract 
shall conform thereto and shall bear the interest 
agreed upoh by the partie·s which shall he specified 
in the judgment, other judgments .shall bear in-
terest at the rate of eight per cent per annum." 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 54( e), in part pro-
vide-s that: 
''The Clerk must include in any judgment 
signed by him any interest on the verdict or dire·c-
tion from the time it was rendered.'' 
The language of the Rule just quoted is clear and as 
such not ·subject to be construed as meaning that inter-
est is included in a judgment without being stated in 
the judgment. The maxim '' Expressio unius est exclusio 
alterious ", is e~specially applicable where as here a 
court is called upon to construe a law. 
35 C.J.S. 341, and cases cited in footnotes to the 
text. By requiring that interest must be included in the 
judgment such language excluded a construction that 
the judgment included interest even if silent as to 
interest. 
18 
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l)OIKT II. 
IF TIIJt~ FAILURE TO INCLUDE INTEREST 
1~ Tfllt~ .JC1H;I\IJ1~~T OF, OCTOBER 30, 1957, WAS 
lNTENrl1 LO~AL IN THE BELIEF THAT INTEREST 
~llUlTLD ~OT BE GRANTED, SUCH JUDGMENT 
:\L\ Y ~UT BE LA \YFULLY AJ\IIENDED TO IN-
CLUDE INTEREST. 
The law dealing with the amendments of a judg-
ment a~ to intere~t is thus stated in Freernan on Ju.dg-
11/CIIfs, 5th Ed., Vol. I, page 301, section 153: 
··To be subject to correction by amendment 
nl'tcr the judgment has becon1e final, errors, with 
respect to interest, must be merely clerical or an 
inadYertent mistake. Judicial error awarding or 
withholding interest or not stating the amount of 
it, rendering judgment, like other judicial error, 
is not properly an1endable. '' 
.A number of cases are cited in footnote in support 
of the text. 
No evidence was -offered in this ca·se which shows 
that the fRilure to include interest in the judgment was 
not intentional. 
POINT III. 
IJ.i, DAIRY DISTRIBUTORS EVER HAD A 
RIGHT TO IIA VE IXTEREST ADDED TO THE 
19 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
JUD·GMENT OF OCTOBER 30, 1957, IT HAS LOST 
SUCH RIGHT BY THE AFFIRMANCE OF SAID 
JUDGMENT WITHOUT INTEREST BY THE SU-
PREME COURT OF UTAH AND BY THE DECISION 
OF THE UNITED STATES TENTH CIRCUIT 
COURT OF APPEALS. 
In 1936 Congress enacted a law which permitted the 
Supreme Court of the United States to relax the com-
mon law with respect to when the court may amend its 
judgment. Some changes were 1nade in the Rule of Civil 
Procedure, adopted by the Supreme Court of the United 
States after the Rules were first adopted. Rule 60 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure assumed its present 
form in 1948. A history of Federal Rule 60, together 
with cases a-pplying the Rule is contained in U.S.C.A. 28, 
pages 121-174. Federal Rule 60, as it has existed since 
l 948 provides as follows : 
"Relief from Judgment or Order. (a) Clerical 
Mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, order's 
or other parts of the record and errors therein 
arising from oversight or omission may be cor-
rected by the court at any time of its own initia-
tive or on the motion of any party and after such 
notice, if any, as the court orders. During the 
pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so 
corrected before the appeal is docketed in the 
appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal 
is pending may be ~so corrected with leave ·of the 
appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neg-
lect; Newly Disco;vered Evidence; Fraud, Etc. 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
20 
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court may relieve a party or his leg·al representa-
tive I' rom a final judgment, order or proceeding 
for the following reasons: (1) Inistakes, inadver-
tPHee, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly 
diseoYered evidence which by due diligence could 
not lwve been diseovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether 
heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 
misrepresentation, or other miscond,uct of an 
adverse party; ( 4) the judgment is void; (5) the 
judgment has been satisfied, released, or dis-
charged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or 
it is no longer equitable that the judgment should 
have pPospective application; or (6) any other 
reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. The nwtion shall be made within a 
reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) 
uot more than one year after the judgment, order 
or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion 
under this subdivision (b) does not affect the 
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. 
This rule does not limit the power of a court to 
l'ntertain an independent action to relieve a party 
from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to 
g·rant relief to a defendant not actually personally 
notified as provided in Title 28, U.S.C. Para. 16!55, 
or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the 
C\lnrt. \Y rits or cormn nobis, corain vobis, audita 
querela, and biUs of review and bills in the nature 
of a bill of review, are abolished, and the proce .. 
dure for obtaining any relief from a judgment 
shall be by nwtion as prescribed in these rules or 
by an independent action.'' 
~-\mong the cases construing and applying Federal 
Hule 60, is the case of llotne Indemnity Co. v. O'Brien, 
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112 Fed. 2d 387, decided in 1940. It is there held that 
notwithstanding the law provides for interest on judg-
ment, if the trial court failed to expressly grant judg-
ment· for interest on said judgment, and appeal is bad 
from such a judgment and the judgment is merely af-
firmed the trial court to which the n1andate or remititur 
is returned may not amend or alter such judgment so 
affirmed by the appellate court. The view is there ex-
pressed that the trial court may not look to the provision 
of the law with respect to intereist, but is bound to follow 
the direction of the mandate of the appellate court. A 
number of cases are cited in that opinion which were 
decided prior to the aoption of the Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure in which it is held that a trial court may not 
change or amend a judgment which has once been af-
firmed by an appellate court unless the trial court is, 
by the opinion, granted authority to make ·such change. 
That the matter of disallowing interest even if provided 
for by law is not a clerical error but an error of sub-
stance and as such controlled by provision of Rule 60(b) 
above quoted, which rule does not confer upon district 
courts the power to alter or amend a judgment affirmed 
by Circuit Courts of Appeals of the United States. See 
Gray v. Dukedom Bank, supra, and Wesco Food Co. v. 
Demase, 100 Fed. Supp. 386. 
The. law announced in the Home Ind·emnity Company 
v. 0 'Brien, supra, has been approved and followed in the 
case of Briggs Administratrix v. Pennsylvania Railway, 
supra, and the cases there cit·ed; als·o, in the case of 
Clark v. H'ot Springs, etc., supra. 
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The fullowiug Utah C<l~L·~ snpport or tend to support 
tlw lnw tllnt i[ nn Hppl'llate court ~n;-;tains a judg1nent 
ot' t IH· trial c·ourt whi<'h is silL•nt as to interest, the trial 
('lllll'l i~ without jurisdidion to amend the judgment by 
nddi ng· illll· n·st to the jnclg-rnent: 
Rl'ece \'. Kuott, 3 Utah 431, 24 Pac. 24 Pac. 757; 
~Viclwls Y. U.P. Ranu·ay Co., 7 Utah 510, 27 Pac. 
(i!>3; Keller Y. Chounws, 95 Utah 31, 79 Pac. 2d 
S(i; Da Nouclt Y. District Court, 95 Utah 227, 79 
Puc. ~J 1006. 
POINT IY. 
_.\.NY RIGIIT TI-IAT DAIRY DISTRIBUTORS 
jL\. 'l 1L\ VE HAD TO .A1IEND TI-lE JUDGMENT O:B, 
OCTOBl~H 30, 1957, \Y.AS AND IS BARRED BY THE 
PBUVl~lON8 OF RULE 60, UTAI-I RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE. 
In tlw case of Lees Y. Freeman, 19 Utah 481, in con-
struing the provisions of the Law of Utah of 1888, the 
:--iupn'llll' Court of Utah held that notwithstanding such 
law provided that a judgment 1nay be a1nended upon a 
proper showing within six months after judgment was 
tendered, the court lost jurisdiotion to make amend-
ment:3 after the expiration of the six months period. 
In the case of Frost v. D,istrict Court of the Fifth 
Jurlirial District, 83 Pae. 2d 737, 96 Utah 106, decided in 
1 !l:~~. it i~ held that a judgment may not be altered after 
the time fixed hy law in n1atter of substance notwith-
:--tnnding the trial c·ourt indicated in its opinion that a 
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judgment other than actually entered should be made. 
In 1950, pursuant to act of Legislature, the Supreme 
Court of Utah adopted a Code of Civil Procedure which 
in the main is an adoption of the rule.s theretofore adopt-
ed by the Supreme Court of the United States. Indeed, 
the rules indicate that the Rule.s of the United States are 
to become the rules of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Subdivision (a) of Utah Rules is copied verbatum from 
Rule (a) of the Federal Rule above quoted. Subdivision 
(b) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows: 
"(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neg-
lect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, Etc. On 
motion and upon such terms as are just, the court 
may in the futherance of justice relieve a party 
or his legal representative from a final judgment, 
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: 
(1) mistage, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect; (2) newly di·scovered evidence which by 
due dilig~nce could not have been discovered in 
time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b) ; 
(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated in-
trinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other 
misconduct of an adverse party; ( 4) when, for 
any cause, the summons in an action has not been 
personally served upon the defendant as required 
by ;Rule 4( e) and the defendant has failed to 
appear in said action; ( 5) the judgment is void; 
( 6) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or 
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or 
it is no longer equitable that the judgment should 
have prospe·ctive application; or (7) any other 
reason justifying relief from the operation of 
the judgment. The motion shall be made within 
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u reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), 
or ( 4), not more than three months after the 
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or 
takmt. A nwtion under this subdivision (b) does 
not affect the finality of a judgment or ·suspend 
its operation. This rule does not limit the power 
of a court to entertain an independent action to 
relieve a party from a judgment, order or pro-
eeecling or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon 
the court. The procedure for <>btaining any relief 
from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed 
in these rules or by an independent action.'' 
It is familiar doctrine as stated in the third edition 
of Sutherland au Statu.tory Construction, Vol. II, Page 
551, Sec. 5209: 
"Where the Legislature of a state has used a 
8tature of another state or country as a guide for 
the preparation and enactment of a statute, the 
courts of the adopting ·state will usually adopt the 
eonstruction placed on the statute in the jurisdic-
tion of its adoption. The reason usually given for 
this rule is that in adopting the statute, the Legis-
lature is presumed to have adopted the construc-
tion which has b_een put on the statute by the 
courts of the state of its adoption.'' 
It will be observed that Subidivison (b) of Rule 60 
of the State Rttles is substantially the same as the Fed-
eral Rule. It therefore follows that when the state court 
adopted Subdivision (b) of Rule 60, it adopted the pro-
" ision of the construction placed thereon by the federal 
courts, particularly the case of Home Indemnity Com-
pany v. O'Brien, supra, which was decided in the year 
1940, and remained the law at the time the State Ru1es 
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of Civil Procedure were adopted, and is still the estab-
lished federal law as shown by the cases heretofore cited. 
It, therefore, follows that when the Supreme Conrt of 
Utah and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed 
the judgment rendered by the Third District Court of 
Salt Lake County, Utah, the trial court was bound by 
the judgment so rendered and may not ignore the man-
date or direction of the appellate courts. 
POINT V. 
IF DtAIRY DISTRIBUTORS, INC., EVER HAD 
A RIGHT TO HAVE INTER.EST ADDED TO THE 
JUDG:NlENT RENDERED ON OCTOBER 30, 19,57, 
IT LOST SUCH RIGHT BY REASON OF THE FACT 
THAT IT DID NOT SEEK: TO HAVE SUCH AMEND-
~IENT MADE WITHIN THE TIME FIXED BY 
RULE 60(b) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE. 
It will be seen that under Rule 60 (b) "the motion 
to arnend a judgment must be rnade within a reasonable 
time and for reasons (1), (2), (3) or (4) not more than 
three months after the judgment, order or proceeding 
was entered or taken." It will be seen that a period of 
six years and about five months elapsed fron1 the time 
the jltdgment was taken until the rnotion was made to 
amend that judgment. It would seem obvious that an 
amendrnent adding about 52jr to the amount of the 
judgment rendered by the judgment of October 30, 1957, 
ir-; a very substantial amendment. \Ve ·shall not add to 
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the eases so holdiug because the law announced in the 
<'ases heretofore cited hold that interest added to a 
judgment i~ a substantial amendment. 
POINT VI. 
THE DOCTRINE OF THE ESTOPPEL OR RES 
JUDICATA PRECLUDES THE COURT FROM LAW-
FULLY ADDING INTEREST TO THE JUDGMENT 
RENDERED ON OCTOBER 30, 1957. 
Upon the appeal frorn the judgment rendered in the 
District Court o.f Salt Lake County, Utah, on October 30, 
1957, it was argued at length that such judgment was a 
proper and valid judgment. The Supreme Court of Utah 
so held. In the proceedings had before the United States 
District Court, the United States Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals and in the suit brought in the District Court of 
Cache County, Utah, it was argued that the defendants 
were precluded from questioning the validity of the 
judgment rendered on October 30, 1957, under the doc-
trine of res judicata. It was not until six year.s and 
about five months after that judgment was rendered 
that the claim was made that such judgment was wrong 
and that it did not provide for interest. Obviously, the 
doctrine of res judicata binds the plaintiff as well as the 
defendants. Erickson v. Slomar, 94 Fed. 2d 437, 440; 
lVebcr Y. Hertzell, 230 Fed. 965; Lovejoy v. Murray, 70 
U.S.1. 
The law seems uniform in holding that the doctrine 
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of res judicata applies to all parties to an action and 
those in privity with such parties. 
We quote the following from the opinion rendered 
in the action in which plaintiff herein was the appellant 
in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals: 
"Whether its judgnwnt was right or wrong it 
stands unassailed and is binding upon the parties. 
Any other view would create uncertainty by un-
dermining the conclusive character of judgments 
and would permit the revival of litigation once 
terminated; consequences ·which it was the very 
purpose of the doctrine of res judicata to avoid." 
For the reasons stated and sub1nitted, the judgment 
or order appealed from should be reversed with costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLARENCE BECK: 
ELIAS HASEN 
BRUNDAGE, HACKLER 
& ROSEMAN 
By JOHN J. DUNN 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Dated this ........................ day of August, 1964. 
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.\PPENDIX - EXHIBIT A 
FI~DI~OS OF FACT AND CO~CLUSIONS OF LAW 
This cause came on regularly for trial on the 26th 
day of May, 1960, before the court sitting without a jury. 
()ounsel for the re>spective parties appeared and evidence 
was offered in support of the pleadings of the respective 
parties. The court having heard the evidence and duly 
considered the same now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
I. The plaintiff, is, and at all times herein men-
tioned wa~, an unincorporated association with its prin-
cipal place of business at San Francisco, California; the 
defendant is a corporation organized puDsuant to the 
laws of the State of Utah, with its principal place of 
business in Utah; the matter in controversy herein ex-
eeeds the sum of $10,000.00. 
II. The defendant Dairy Distributors, Inc., brought 
an action for damages in the District Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, against the plaintiff, Western 
Conference of Teamsters, and several other defendants, 
based upon the claim the defedants entered into a con-
spiracy to induce and encourage the employees of N. 
Dorman and Company not to handle any shipments of 
good-s transported by Dairy Distributors, Inc., to the 
said X. Dorman and Company contrary to the provisions 
of the "Labor ~Ianagen1ent Relations Act, 1947. '' De-
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fendant Dairy Distributors, Inc., clairned that in this 
(dfort to so influence said employees, the defendants en-
listed the aid of Teamster Local 277 of New York City, 
which represented the said employees of N. Dorman and 
Company, and pursuant thereto, certain early morning 
picketing of defendant's truck occurred on July 26, 1955, 
at or near the premises of the said N. Dorman and 
Company. 
III. The action in the District Court of Salt Lake 
County was tried commencing October 23, 19·57, and fol-
lowing a jury verdict in favor of Dairy Distributing, Inc., 
judgment was rendered on October 29, 1957, ag·ainst the 
plaintiff Western Conference of Teamsters and all the 
other defendants, except the defendants Rash, Lott and 
Ballew, in the sum of $100,000.00, which judgment was 
affiirmed by the Utah Supreme Court. 
IV. The purported service of process upon 'Vestern 
Conference of Teamster.s in the aforementioned state 
courte case wa.s had upon one Joseph Ballew. The court 
:finds that at the time the said Joseph Ballew was so 
served he was a stranger to 'V estern Conference of 
rreamsters in that he was not an employee, officer, general 
agent or other agent of this plaintiff herein nor had he 
ever been, por was he at that time or ever authorized by 
appointment or by law to receive service for or in behalf. 
of the plaintiff herein. Plaintiff 'Yestern Conference of 
rreamsters1 during all times mentioned in the state court 
uCtion, had no property in the State of Utah, neither did 
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it. have, nor did it hold istelf out as having, an office or 
place of business in the State of Utah. 
V. The court finds that at no time mentioned in 
defendant's state court action, nor at any other time 
during its existcuee, did the plaintiff, Western Confer-
uwe of Teamsters, exist for the purpose, in whole or 
in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievance·s 
labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employ-
ment, or conditions of work. 
YI. The court finds that plaintiff, Western Confer-
ence of Teamsters, did not negotiate with employers 
respecting conditions of work and labor in behalf of 
employees, at any tin1e mentioned in defendant's state 
court action or at any other time. 
VII. The court finds that plaintiff, Western Con-
ference of Teamsters is not and never has been an organ-
ization in which employees participate respecting hours 
or conditions of work and labor or an organization in 
which employees are eligible to n1embership or affiliation, 
within the Ineaning of the "Labor Management Relations 
Act, 1947. '' 
YIII. The court finds that defendant, Dairy Dis-
tributors, Inc., laid its claim to recover and brought its 
action in the state court under and pursuant to the pro-
Yisions of Section 303 of the "Lahor Management Re-
lations Act, 1947. '' 
IX. At all times complained of in the state court 
action the defendant, Dairy Distributors, Inc., was en-
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gaged in interstate com1nerce as a contract carrier by 
motor vehicle, hauling cheese from Utah to New York 
and hauling various other items from points in the East 
and Midwest to Utah. There was no evidence in the state 
court record, nor in the record here, that the defendant, 
Dairy Distributors, Inc., had a certificate of convenience 
and necessity from the Interstate Commerce Commission 
to engage in said trucking operation. There was, how-
ever, affirmative evidence in the state court record, and 
in the record here, and counsel for defendant admit, that 
defendant, Dairy Distributors, Inc., did not have such 
a permit, and such is the finding of this court. The en-
gaging in interstate commerce without .such a permit 
constitutes a criminal offense as provided in Title 49, 
Section 322, U.S.C'.A. 
X. That the basis of the verdict and judgment in 
the state court was that the acts of picketing complained 
of and the damage resulting therefrom was caused by a 
conspiracy between the party who did the picketing and 
Local Union 277, whereby such Local Union 277 and its 
members who were the employees of the said N. Dorman 
and Company .were induced to resfuse to handle and 
process the cheese that was to be delivered to N. Dor-
man and Company by the defendant Dairy Distributors, 
Inc. 
XI. That on the 25th day of Octo her, 1955, the 
defendant herein, the Cache Valley Dairy Association, 
General Counsel for the National Labor Relations Board 
and the above mentioned Teamster's Local Union 277, 
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onlt>red into a Stipulation and Agree1nent as contained 
in plaintiff's Exhibit "1'' in this cause. 
XII. That thereafter on D~ecember 15, 1955, the 
National Labor Relations Board made and entered its 
Decision and Order as set out in Exhibit "E" attached 
to the Complaint on file herein. 
XIII. That pursuant to the foregoing order the 
above mentioned Local Union 277 posted notice to all of 
its member N.employees of N. Dorman and Company, a 
copy of which notice is attached to the Complaint as a 
part of Exhibit "E ". 
XIY. That thereafter pursuant to the above men-
tioned Agreement and Stipulation and the Order and 
Decision of the National Labor Relations Board, the 
United States Circuit Court of Appea1s for the Second 
Circuit made and entered its Decree as set out in Exhibit 
XY. That pursuant to the above mentioned Dooree 
of the United States Circuit Court, the above mentioned 
Loeal Union 277 caused to be posted a notice, a copy of 
which is a part of the Decree as set out in Exhibit "I'' 
of plaintiff's Complaint herein. 
XYII. The claim ·of damage for the destruction of 
the business of plaintiff in the State court case, and the 
verdict and judgn1ent rendered therein was bas·ed on a 
threat. by the defendants, in concert with Local 277, of 
~m inducement to concerted action by the employees of 
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N. Dorman and Company to cease handling the products 
delivered by Dairy Distributors, Inc., at the time of, and 
following, the picketing of business in New York City. 
Said judgm·ent was predicated upon a continuing and 
future concerted action on the part of the e'mployee 
members of· Local 277 to refuse to unload said vehicles 
from said date as might be induced from tin1e to time 
by the defendants in the State court in concert with Lo-
cal 277 and in violation of the Taft-Hartley Act. This 
court finds that upon entering into said Stipulation and 
the entering of said Order·s the said conspiracy termin-
ated and such threat of Dorman's employees not to un-
load such products there by ceased. 
* * * * 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Fro mthe foregoing facts, the court now makes and 
enter.s these, its Conclusions of Law: 
1. This court ha~s jurisdiction of this proceeding. 
2. The enforcement of the State court judgment 
against the plaintiff should be enjoined for the following 
reasons: 
(a) The State court failed to obtain jurisdiction of 
the person of the plaintiff, Western Conference of Team-
sters. 
(b) 'rhe state court failed to obtain jurisdiction of 
the ·s~bject matter of the action because the plaintiff 
herein is not and was not a labor organization within 
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the definition and meaning of Section 2(5) of the Labor 
~lanagement Relations Act, 1947, and is therefore exempt 
and immune form liability under Section 303 of this Act. 
(c) The State court judgment was a recovery for 
injuries to an illegal business which was operating in 
\'iolation of the laws and policy of the United State.s, and 
its enforcement should be obtained to protect the inter-
ests of the United States, its citizens and the transpor-
tation of goods and merchandise in interstate commerce. 
• • • • 
3. .A judgment should be rendered herein enjoin-
ing the defendant from enforcing the above entitled 
judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 109069 in the Dis-
trict Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, against 
this plaintiff, and plaintiff should have a judgment for 
its costs incurred herein. 
4. Let judgment be entered accordingly. 
Dated this 14th day of October, 1960. 
Willis W. Ritter 
United States District Judge 
Filed Oct. 11, 1960. 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
This cause came on regularly for hearing on the 
:26th day of May, 1960, before the court sitting without 
a jury. The court having heretofore made its Findings 
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of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and being now fully 
advised in the premises : 
Now, therefore, it i.s ORDERED, ADJUDGFJD AND 
DECREED that the defendant herein be perpetually 
enojined from enforcing its judgment against the plain-
tiff herein which was rendered by the District Court of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in Case No. 109069 on 
the 29th day of October, 1957. 
It is further Ordered that the plaintiff herein have 
its costs herein incurred. 
Dated this 14th day of Oct., 1960. 
By the Court: 
Willis W. Ritter 
United States District Judge 
Notation of entry of J udgrnent made in civil docket 
on October 17, 19·60, inaccordance with Rule 79· of Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
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.._\PPE~DIX -- EXHIBIT B 
United States Court of Appeals 
Tenth Circuit 
July Term, 1961 
D ... \IRY DISTRIBUTORS, INC., ) 
Appellant, 
DAIRY DISTRIBUTORS, INC., I No. 6629 
\\'ESTERN CONFERENCE OF TEAM-
STERS, Appellee. 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
Arthur A. Allen (Hanson, Baldwin & Allen ~ere with him on the 
brief) for Appellant. 
Elias Hansen (Clarence M. Beck and A. Park Smoot were with him 
on the brief) for Appellee. 
Douglas McHendrie (John F. Mueller and Grant, Shafroth, Toll and 
McHendrie were with him an the brief) for Amici Curiae. 
Before PHILLIPS, PICKETT and LEWIS, Circuit Judges. 
LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
This appeal is taken from a decree of the District 
Court for the Dlistrict o.f Utah which perpetually enjoined 
Dairy Distributors, Inc. from enforcing a judgment for 
$100,000 obtained against the \Y estern Conference of 
Teamster~ in the state courts of Utah. Appellant's basic 
contention of error is that the United State District 
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Court has but relitigated issues fully detern1ined in the 
state court action and has premised the injunction upon 
findings of fact and conclusions of law that are in simple 
disagreement with the findings and conclusions of the 
state court. The United States District Court so says 
appellant, has undertaken to sit in appellate review upon 
a ,state court case after that case has been set at final 
rest by the Supreme Court of Utah. Appellee defends 
the issuance of the injunction upon the ground that the 
federal district court has correctly found that the state 
court judgment was without jurisdictional foundation of 
either person or subject matter and upon issues involv-
ing a federal question. We will hereafter refer to appel-
lant here and plaintiff in the state court action as the 
Company and appeUee here and defendant in state court 
as We~stern Conference. 
The factual background of the controversy as it 
developed and reached the state courts of Utah is fully 
set forth in the opinion of the :Supreme Court of Utah. 
See Dairy Distrtibutors v. Lo,cal Union 976, 8 Utah 2d 
124, 239 P. 2d 414, cert. den. 360 U.S. 909. In brief, the 
action was brought by the Company to recover for dam-
ages occasioned by Local Union 976, Joint Council 67, 
Western Conference. The International Brotherhood of 
Team.sters, and others, through conduct prohibited by 29, 
U.S.C.A. 187 (.Sec. 303, Labor Management Relations 
.Act, 61 Stat. 158).1 Jurisdiction of such a cause of action 
1 29 U.S.C.A. 187 . 
.. (a) It shall be unlawful, for the purposes of this section only, in an 
industry or activity affecting commerce, for any labor organi7;ation to engage 
in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, 
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is granted to state courts having jurisdiction of the 
parties by Sec. 30:~ (b) of the Act. Jurisdiction also speci-
fically lies in the district court of the United States. 
Among the defenses advanced by Western Confer-
enec in the state court action were the claims that service 
of process was invalid and that the state court lacked 
juvisdiction of the subject matter as it applied to Wes-
tern Conference. Specifically, Western Conference con-
tended that it wa1s not a labor organization as that term 
is included in the provisions of the Labor Management 
Act.» Both issues were decided adversely to We,stern 
Conference in the state trial ·court and presented to the 
U tab Supreme Court on appeal. That high court held, 
329 P. 2d 414 at 419: 
"Defendant's Point II contends that the West-
ern Conference of Teamster's is exempt from this 
litigation, not being a labor ·organization within 
the contemplation of Title 29, Sec. 152(5) U.S.C.A. 
There is evidence in the reeo·rd to indicate that 
a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, 
manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, 
articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object 
thereof is-
.. (1) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed persons to 
join any lobar or employer organization or any employer or other person 
to cease using, seling, handling, transporting, or· otherwise dealing in the 
products of any other producer, processer, or manufacturer, or to cease 
doing business with any other person; 
.. (2) forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bar~ 
gain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees unless 
such labor ·organization has been certified as the representative of such 
employees under the provision! of section 159 of this title; 
'Sec. 2(5), 29 U.S.C.A. 152(5) . 
.. The term 'labor organization • m_eans any . organization of any kind, 
or any agency or employee representatiOn committee or plan, in which em~ 
p)oyees. parti_cipate and which exi~ts for. the purpose, in whole or in part, 
of dealmg wtth employers concermng gnevances, lbaor disputes, wages rates 
of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work." ' 
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Western Conference of Tean1sters had jurisdic-
tion over local teamster unions in the 11 western 
states; that Local 976, of which Rash was an 
officer, was affiliated with the Western Confer~ 
ence, and that it in turn was affiliated with the 
International Union. Under such circumstances 
we cannot say that the Western Oonference of 
Teamsters was not a labor organization under 
the broad definition of the act." 
But both iHsues were found by the United States 
Di,strict Court in favor of Western Conference as fol-
low: 
''IV. The purported ~service of process upon 
Western Conference of Teamrsters in the afore-
mentioned state court case was had upon one 
Joseph Ballew. The court finds that at the time 
the said Joseph Ballew was so served he was a 
stranger to Western Conference of Teamsters in 
that he was not an employee, officer, general agent 
or other agent of the plaintiff herein nor had he 
ever been, nor was he at that time or ever author-
ized by appointment nor by law to receive rService 
for· or in he half of the plaintiff herein. Plaintiff 
Western Conference of Teamrsters, during all 
times mentioned in the state court action, had no 
property in the State .of Utah, neither did it have 
nor did it hold itself out as having, an office or 
place of business in the State of Utah, nor did it 
do any busine~ss in the State of Utah.'' 
"VII. The court finds that plaintiff, Western 
Conference of Teamsters, is not and never has 
been an organization in which employees partici-
pate re~specting hours or conditions of work and 
labor or an organization in which employees are 
eligible to membership or affiliation, within the 
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nwaning of the ''Labor Management Relations 
Act, 1947 '." 
The grant of jurisdiction to state courts to try and 
dt><'ide certain issues under the Labor Management Act 
('arries with it the inherent power to interpret the Act 
and to decide factual matters necessary for the proper 
and laful administration of the Act. The grant of such 
jurisdiction to state courts and the similar grant to the 
United States District Court does not contemplate a 
dual remedy or a dry run in either court. It does con-
template a finality of determination in either juri,sdiction 
of every proper issue presented. The rule is not altered 
nor weakened by the event that the is,sue may reach the 
field of jurisdiction when that subject is detpendent upon 
fact affecting per.son or subject n1atter. The issue of jur-
isdiction must reach finality the same as any other issue. 
Lewis Y. Carver, 10 Cir. 237 F. 2d 516; .&merican Surety 
of New York v·. Baldwin, 267 U.S. 156, 53 S. Ct. 98, 77 L. 
Ed. 231; Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 
60 S. Ct. 44, 84 L. Ed. 85. Here, Western Conference en-
tered the state court to litigate the issue, among others, 
of the validity of the service of process upon one Ballew 
(or Ballou) as an agent of Western Conference. The 
state trial court, upon consideration of evidence which 
is neither before us nor was before the United States 
District Court, determined Ballew to be an agent of 
\Vestern Conference and accordingly found a valid ser-
Yice of proces·s upon Western Conference. This judg-
ment was affirmed against direct attack in the Supreme 
Court o Utah. Had this issue originated in the United 
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States District Court our present review would have con-
cerned the evidence viewed by the federal trial court as 
demonstrating that no such agency existed. But we make 
no such review. On a similar contest of jurisdiction, the 
United States Supreme Court has held: 
''The substantial matter for determination is 
whether the judgment amounts to res judicata on 
the question of the jurisdiction of the court which 
rendered it over the pers-on of the respondent. 
It is of· no moment that the appearance was a 
special one eXJpressly saving any submiBsion to 
such jurisdiction .... The special appearance 
gives point to the fact that the respondent en-
tered the ~1issouri court for the very purpose of 
litig~ting the question of jurisdiction over its 
person. It has the election not to appear at all. 
If, in the absence of appearance, the court had 
pro·ceeded to judgment and the present suit had 
been brought thereon, respondent could have 
raised and tried out the issue in the present ac-
tion, because it would never have had its day in 
court with respect to jurisdiction ... It had also 
the right to appeal from the decision of the Mis-
souri District Court, ... It elected to tallow 
neither of those courses, but, after having been 
defeated upon full hearing in it contention as to 
jurisdiction, it to~ok no further steps, and the 
judgment in que~stion resulted." Baldwin v. State 
Trapeling Men's Association, 283 U.S. 522 at 524, 
51 S. Ct. 517, 75 L. Ed. 1244. 
We think it clear that the determination of the Utah 
court that it had juri,sdiction over the person of Western 
Conference through the ~service of process upon one 
found to be an agent of Westenn Conference is res judi-
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eata of that issue. The necPssity of examining the ques-
tion of agency is often the pivotal point in determining 
juri~diction of either person or subject matter and can 
and does form the premise of the do?trine of res judi-
enta as between state and federal courts. In McCarthy v. 
State, et al., I Utah 2d 205, 265 P. 2d 387, the Supreme 
Court of Utah applied the principle of finality of judg-
ment where the federal court had earlier considered the 
claim of agency of state officers acting under the compul-
sion o.f a state statute. The federal court had dismissed 
the action because the named individual defendants were 
not the real parties in interest. Such ruling required a 
determination of agency and an interpretation of a .state 
~tatute. The action was then filed in the state court and 
was di·smissed as being res judicata. In affirming this 
dismissal the Utah Court stated: 
''The issue was settled by the F·ederal Court, 
as hereinabove indicated, and it was not the pre-
rogative of the State District Court nor of this 
Court ou appeal to review or reverse that deci-
sion. \Yhether its judgment was right or wrong, 
it stands unassailed and i~S binding· upon the par-
ties. AnY other view would create uncertainty by 
undermining the conclusive character of judg-
ments and would permit the revival of litigation 
once terminated; consequences which it was the 
very purpose of the dcortine of res judicata to 
avoid.'' 
\Y estern Conference stenuously urges that it is not 
a labor organization within the bounds of that term as 
defined in the Labor-:Management Act and that a deter-
43 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ruination to the contrary in a state court cannot be res 
judicata upon such an issue. The ruling does, of course, 
require a determination and application of fact to an in-
terpretation of Sec. 2 ( 5) of the A·ct and the correctness 
of such rulings is of utmost importance in the administra-
tion of the Act. But adequate protection against the frus-
tration of federal law by unsound interpretation or appli-
cation in state courts lies in the power of the Supreme 
Court of the United States to review by certiorari the 
judgments of state supreme courts upon matters of fed-
eral O·r constitutional law. In Norris v. Alabama, 294 U . .S. 
587, 55 S. Ct. 579, 79 L. Ed. 1074, the power and duty is 
recognized by Mr. Justice Hughes thus: 
"That the question is ·one of fact does not re-
lieve us of the duty to determine whether in truth 
a federal right has been denied. vVhen a federal 
right has been specially set up and claimed in a 
State court, it is ~our province to inquire not 
merely whether it was denied in express terms 
but also whether it was denied in substance and 
effect. If this requires an examination of evidence, 
that examination must he made. Otherwise, re-
view by this Court would fail of its purpose in 
safeguarding constitutional rights. Thus, when-
ever a conclusion of law ·of a state court as to a 
federal right and findings of fact ars so int.er-
Iningled that the later control the f,ormer, it is 
incumbent UJpon us to analyze the facts in order 
that the appropriate enforcement of the federal 
right may be assured.'' 
In the instant case certiorari was sought and denied 
by the Supreme Court of the United States from the 
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judgment of the Supreme Court of Utah. Such denial 
does not pstablish the correctness of the particular judg-
ment but Sl'l'VPs only to establish the finality of the judg-
ment as between the particular parties. The ·same issue 
('annot be renewed by initiation of an action in the United 
States District Court. 
Amici Curiae join \V estern Conference in 'arguing 
that it has now been admitted that the appellant company· 
held no certificate of public convenience and necessity 
required by the Interstate Commerce Commi~ssion as a 
condition to doing business as an interstate contract 
carrier ;3-that the evidence demonstrates that the appel-
lant was operating an interstate trucking business with-
out authority; and that for these reasons appellant 
should be denied enforcement of its judgment. 
The Interstate Commerce A·ct does not provide for 
court action for Yiolation of the provi~sions of that act, 
but does provide, 49 U.S.C.A. 13(1): 
'' ( 1) Any person, firm, corporation, company 
or association, or any mercantile, agricultural, or 
manufacturing society or other organization, or 
any body politic or municipal organization, or 
any COinii}On carrier complaining of anything 
done or omitted to be done by any common carrier 
subject to the provisions of this chapter in con-
traYention of the provisions thereof, may apply 
8-fhe opinion of the Supreme Court of Utah may indicate that that 
Court considered this point upon an erroneous assumption of fact. 329 P. 
2d 414 at 420. If so, the proper remedy lay in urging the Utah Court to 
~ correct such error. We consider the contention only because from the record 
before us and the opinion of the Supreme Court of Utah we cannot clearly 
1: determine whether the Utah court considered and acted upon the issue. 
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to said Commis·sion by petition, which shall 
briefly state the facts; whereupon a statement of 
the eomplaint thus made shall be forwarded by 
the ·Commission to such Ctommon carrier, who shall 
be called upon to satisfy the complaint, or to an-
swer the same in writing, within a reasonable 
time, to be specified by the Commission. If ·such 
common carrier within the time specified shall 
make reparation for the injury alleged to have 
been done, the common carrier shall be relieved 
of liability to the complainant only for the par-
ti·cular violation of law thus complained of. If 
such carrier or carriers shall not satisfy the com-
plaint within the time .specified, or there shall 
appear to he any reasonable ground for investi-
gating said complaint, it shall be the duty of the 
Commis·sion to investigate the matters complained 
of in such matter and by such means as it shall 
deem proper.'' 
and, 49 U .. S.C.A. 12(1): 
"(1) The Commission shall have authority, in 
order to perform the duties and carry out the 
objects for which it was created, to inquire into 
and repo-rt on the management of the business 
of all eommon carriers subject to the provisions 
of this chapter, ... The Commission is authorized 
and required to execute and enforce the provisions 
of this chapter; and, upon the request of the Com-
mis·sion, it shall be the duty of any United States 
attorney to whom the Commission may apply to 
insi{itute in the proper court ... all necessary pro-
ceedings for the enforcem·ent of the provisions o.f 
this chapter and for the punishment of all viola-
tions thereof .... '' 
It is clear that the matters of interstate transporta-
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tion of goods were entrusted to the Commission by Con-
~ress and the role of the courts in the administration of 
the policies is limited to enforcing, enjoining, setting 
a~ide, annulling or suspending orders o.f that body, 28 
l'.H.C.A. 1336, 28 U.S.C.A. 2321, 49 U.S.C.A. 16. The 
nword here indicates that the Cmnmission has licensed 
the appellant as a private carrier; no complaint of this 
uction ha~ been made to the Commission; and if damage 
a rose as a result of improper licensing or improper use 
of the g-ranted certificate, it is not apparent . 
.. \ppellee has not cited us to a ,case where such a de-
fense was interposed in a court action sounding in tort, 
nor do we think such defense proper. The commission 
has the facilities and powers to investigate all such mat-
tNs and is charged with the responsibility of administer-
ingfi the ~\ct in all its facets. The courts may not usurp 
its ,power in the guise of determination o.f a civil suit. 
Finally, "\\'"estern Conference contends that is was 
deprived of the opportunity of defending, in full, the 
state court action because of extrinsic fraud prepetuated 
by the Company. This contention was presented to the 
state trial court by post-trial motion and was there re-
jected. It was also presented to the United States Dis-
trict Court and was similarly rejected. Fraud is within 
the doctrine of resjudicata, eiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 
7:2G, 66 S. Ct. 853, 90 L. Ed. 970, and can serve as a prem-
i~e to avoid a state court judgment only when it is pre-
St'Bted to a federal court as an original issue. llere, even 
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as an original issue, the claim was found to lack merit 
by the court below. We find no error in the finding. 
Reversed and remanded with directions to vacate 
the injunction. 
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